BS ISO 20214:2015 pdf free download

06-22-2021 comment

BS ISO 20214:2015 pdf free download.Space data and information transfer systems-Security architecture for space data systems.
to better understand the layered security concepts required to secure a space system. As such. BS ISO 20214 is a Security Architecture for Space Data Systems (SASDS).
This architecture uses thc views described in thc Reference Architecture for Space Data Systems (reference [B 1]) developed by the CCSDS Architecture Working Group.
The SASDS riIl be used:
— to establish an overall CCSDS conceptual framework for the incorporation of security into the data systems of space missions;
— to deFine common language and representation SO that risks, requirements, and solutions in the area of security within space data systems can be readily communicated;
— to provide a source of information for the security architects on a space mission to use to develop the system security design;
— to facilitate development of standards in a consistent way so that any standard can be used with other appropriate standards in a system.
1.1.2 SCOPE
BS ISO 20214 presents a security reference architecture for space data systems and is intended to provide a standardized approach for description of security within data system architectures and high-level designs. which individual working groups may use within
For further information regarding security’s role in space systems. the reader is directed to the supporting CCSDS documentation listed in annex B.
RASDS (rcfercncc lB II) describes a method for analyzing complex spacc system architectures. This section bricfly introduces these concepts prior to exploring how they can be used to address security concerns during system design. Reference I B 11 should he consulted for more information on RASDS.
2.2 BACK(;kOtTNl)
Today. ubiquitous terrestrial network connectivity among principal investigators and mission operations has become standard. At the same time, computer processing power and communication resources have progressed steadily to the point that they are easily accessible to potential attackers. These two racts put mission operations more at risk than in the past when operations were carried out over closed, mission-specific networks, and computer and communication resources were not as powerful or widespread. The security risks to both spacecraft and ground systems have increased to the point where CCSDS must foster adoption of specific information security standards (as necessary) in order to protect mission- critical resources and sensitive mission information.
CCSDS promotes secure interoperability for space missions and the incorporation of security within the system. This security architecture helps to complete CCSDS’s overall reference architecture by adding specific guidance for developing the security aspects of a system architecture. The security architecture for a mission should respond to threats identified via a risk assessment, which is necessary to provide mission planners with a better understanding of the risks that they should plan to counter via security technologies.
Key factors to consider for space missions are the vulnerability of sophisticated space or ground resources to potential attackers the consequences of the malicious use of public assets, including consequences of public perception. For example, hacking into the telecommand system of any Mars mission would be estremely visible, extremely embarrassing, and potentially very costly for affected CCSDS member agencies.
RASDS employs multiple views to present a space data system architecture. Space data systems are complex. consist of hardware, software, and organizations, and are frequently composed of elements belonging to different organizations, some of which are on the ground. others of which are in space. Because of the complexity of these systems, it is difficult to depict all of these various aspects in a single framework. As a result, the system architecture is described with multiple views, each focusing on different concerns associated with the system.
A s’iew is a form of abstraction achieved by using a selected set of architectural concepts and structuring rules in order to focus on particular concerns within a space data system. Further background information is available in RASDS (reference I B 1)). Each view is developed in the contest of a specific viewpoint specification.
Five types of’ siewpoints and associated views are described in RASDS:
I) Enterprise Viewpoint: The motivation for Enterprise Views is that thcrc are complex organizational relationships involving spacecraft, instruments, ground systems. scientists. staff, and contractors that are distributed among multiple organizations (space agencies. science institutes, companies, etc). The Enterprise View is used to address these organizational relationship aspects of space data systems. The Enterprise View describes the organizations involved in a space data system and the relationships and interactions among them. The relationships are described in terms of the roles, responsibilities, and policies of the organizations; and the interactions among the organizations arc described in terms of agreements and contracts.
2) Connectivity Viewpoint: The motivation for Connectivity Views is that the physical deployment and behavior of both ground-based and flight-system elements need to be considered. The flight elements are in motion through space and consequently cause network topology and connectivity issues associated with pointing. scheduling, delays due to round-trip light limes, and low signal-to-noise ratios. To deal with these issues, special protocols and functionality are rctuired, The Connectivity View is used to address these aspects of space data systems. The Connectivity View describes the physical structure and physical environments of a space data system.
3) Functional Viewpoint: The motivation for Functional Views is that the behavior of functional elements and their logical interactions should be considered separately from the engineering concerns of where functions are housed, how they are connected. which protocols are used, or what language is used to implement them. The Functional View is used to address these functional aspects of space data systems. The View describes the functional structure of a space data system and how functions interact with each other.
41 Information Viewpoint: The motivation for Information Views is that descriptions of data objects with different structures, relationships, and policies must be provided. These data objects are passed among the functional elements and managed ihat is, stored, located. accessed, and distributed) by information infrastructure elements. The Information View is used to address these aspects of space data systems. The Information View looks at the space data systems from the perspective of the Inilirniation Objects that are exchanged among the Functional Objects.
5) Communications Viewpoint: The motivation for Communications Views is that the layered sets of protocols used to support communications among the functional elements must be described. These must meet the requirements imposed by the connectivity and operational challenges. The Communications View is used to address these aspects of space data systems. The Communications View describes the protocol stacks and mechanisms of information transfer that occur among physical entities (i.e.. Nodes) in a space data system.
The following panigraphs describe the key principles of the CCSDS Security Reference Architecture.
As with all CCSDS Recommended Standards and Practices, all technologies required by the security architecture should be easily available and the licensing reasonable and nondiscriminatory. This does not exclude the use of proprietary technologies; however, for a system to be compatible with any other CCSDS-compatihle system. the technologies used must be freely available (unencumbered) to all. or available via nonrestrictive, nondiscriminatory, reasonable-cost licenses.
The usc of multiple layers of security increases the overall security of the system since the failure of any one security layer will not put the system at risk of compromise.
The architecture should he expandable and evolvable to allow the use of new security technologies, in order, for example, to address new threats or mission requirements. It is desirable to allow already deployed systems to he remotely upgradeahle. including, where possible, spacecraft.
5.5 Ftl.Xlllll.ITY
The architecture should allow for development of different security systems to be developed that will be suitable for the majority of space missions. The use of the security architecture can allow missions to be in-situ configurable so as to be compatibk with each other. This would allow the use of other missions as intermediate nodes and for links to be reconligured as necessary without compromising security.
The architecture should allow elements developed by one organization to intemperate with elements developed by another organization. Adoption of the baselined standard security services, and application of them in standardized ways at identified points in a mission architecture, will ensure that this inieroperability is possible while still ensuring secure operations. Missions may choose to adopt alternate standards and deployments, but would do so at the risk of not being interoperable with elements built to the standards.

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